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The new Army warfighting doctrine, AirLand Operations, is designed for the
army of the 90s, a smaller army, but one which will be faced with global
responsibilities. These responsibilities will range from fighting wars and regional
conflicts, to conducting various peacetime operations in support of allies in the realm
of Low Intensity Conflict. Our success under AirLand Operations will largely depend
upon the ability of the Field Artillery to disrupt enemy C3 elements, and destroy troop
formations from extended ranges early in the battle. The Artillery School (USAFAS)
is currently developing several advanced systems to accomplish this mission. The focus
of this thesis is the Artillery Attack Model (AAM). The AAM is a GAMS Mixed Integer
Linear Programming model developed to assist USAFAS determine the Minimum Cost
Weapon/Munition Mix and Allocation of Fires to targets in order to meet the




The reader is cautioned that the computer program developed in this research
may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been
made, within the time available, to ensure that the program is free of computational
and logic errors, it cannot be considered validated. Any application of this program
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A. OUR NEW WORLD ORDER
1. Era of Change
Our era has been characterized predominantly by change, which has
affected every aspect of our society, including the profession of arms. The three key
elements of change which have borne the greatest impact upon our National Military
Strategy are: the radical changes in the international political environment, our
national fiscal concerns, and the emergence of radically advanced technologies. As a
result of the "New World Order" our National Military Strategy must also change.
In the past we lived in a bipolar world dominated by the United States and
the Soviet Union. We principally practiced a Military Strategy of Forward Defense of
Western Europe in response to the potential threat of nuclear war or High Intensity
Conflict with the Warsaw Pact armies. Over the past two years we have witnessed the
destruction of the Berlin Wall and the reunification ofGermany, as well as the collapse
of the Warsaw Pact, and the democratization of the Soviet Union. We have also
witnessed the signing of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty and the initial
withdrawal of Soviet troops from the region. With the disintegration of the Warsaw
Pact and the breaking-up of the Soviet Union, the Soviets' influence has largely
subsided as they turn their focus inward to resolve their own internal political and
financial crises. Yet the Soviet Union will continue to be the major military force with
which we may have to contend since, despite all of its internal struggles, the Soviet
Union continues to modernize both its conventional and nuclear forces, as well as
expand its space based research efforts. However, in light of recent world political
developments and Soviet internal problems, the US would face a major Soviet threat
in Europe only after a long and visible preparation process.
The United States is also experiencing its own internal crises, specifically
it is faced with a budget deficit of monumental proportions. As a result, all branches
of government are faced with the difficult task of reducing the government workforce
and scaling back funded social and defense programs in an effort to reduce this deficit.
For the military, the impact equates to a reduction of force size and a decrease in the
budget with which to equip the force.
The third element of change is the rapid emergence of advanced
technologies. As the CNN images of precision-guided, long-range Tomahawk cruise
missiles sailing across the morning skies of Baghdad portrayed - we can now see the
battlefield with much greater resolution and immediately respond to what we see with
accurate long-range missiles, rockets, and cannons.
2. A New Threat
In light of these changes, we find ourselves facing a much different threat
than in the past, one much more diverse; one which requires a much different
National Military Strategy. We now find ourselves living in a world whose politics and
economics are being influenced primarily by emerging regional powers (e.g. Japan,
Germany, and Korea). As the recent Iraqi invasion ofKuwait aptly demonstrated, these
regional powers may pose a serious threat to our national interests. These potential
threats are global in nature and range from the Middle East and Northeast Asia to
Latin America. Additionally, they represent a broad spectrum of operational
challenges.
In the future, these potential threats may prove even more dangerous due
to the proliferation of advanced weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction. In
addition to these more obvious potential threats, problems of famine, violence, and
natural disaster will most certainly lead to conflict within developing nations. The
threat of drug traffickers and terrorists is ever present and, in these days of the
shrinking defense dollar, those responsible for the appropriation of government funds
have simultaneously called for the military to take a larger role in combatting these
unconventional threats.
3. A New National Military Strategy
Our revised National Military Strategy must now largely focus on our
flexibility and our ability to project varying levels of combat power to different parts
of the world. Although we must still maintain some forward presence, it will be much
reduced from previous levels.
In support of this strategic direction, the US Army must continue to
provide well-trained, combat-ready forces capable of deploying into varying situations
along the entire Operational Continuum ofWar, Conflict, and Peacetime Competition,
on relatively short notice. War and Conflict are hostile states dominated by the use of
force. Peacetime Competition is a non-hostile state in which we assist allies and
promote democracy through providing military and economic assistance. [Ref. 1]
Previously, our AirLand Battle doctrine focused on the Warsaw Pact threat in Central
Europe, a mechanized Middle East threat, and the threat posed by North Korea. In
today's multi-polar political/military environment the Army's warfighting doctrine
must clearly refocus on the much more diverse threat which we now face.
B. AIRLAND OPERATIONS: OUR NEW DOCTRINE
In light of these political, economic, and technological changes, the Army has
developed a new strategy geared for the US Army of the 90s. This army will be a
smaller army. However, it will be faced with global responsibilities ranging from
fighting wars and regional conflicts, to conducting various peacetime operations in
support of our allies in the realm of Low Intensity Conflict. The Army's revised
warfighting strategy is known as the doctrine of "AirLand Operations." AirLand
Operations refocuses the concepts and capabilities of AirLand Battle for an army
trained and equipped to deploy anywhere in the world and handle a broad spectrum
of missions once deployed. [Ref. 1] As the threat analysis indicates, we must be well
trained in all three levels of operations (War, Conflict, and Peacetime Competition),
equipped to deal with all three, and rapidly deployable to respond to any one (or more)
which threatens our national security.
Of all the changes, technological advancements have had the greatest direct
impact on the battlefield, where they have completely reshaped the conduct of our
operations. In the past we have primarily operated on a structured "linear" battlefield
with set unit boundaries and established terrain objectives. Every unit was tied in with
its adjacent units. Revolutionary surveillance assets now allow us to accurately locate
and monitor enemy forces on the battlefield, while new weapons technology gives us
the potential to engage them with indirect fire at longer ranges and with increased
lethality and accuracy. As a result of these factors, operations conducted on the future
battlefield will be extremely fast paced and much more lethal. With the downsized
army, we will have fewer forces operating across larger areas which will result in
sizeable gaps between units. Unit operations must be highly synchronized but much
more independent resulting in a concept termed the "Nonlinear Battlefield."
Operations on the Nonlinear Battlefield will be characterized by frequent moves,
with units remaining dispersed except when massing to fight the maneuver battle in
order to maximize survivability. These operations will take place in four stages:
1. Detection - Preparation
During this stage, the commander determines how he wants to fight the
enemy. He employs various electronic and human sensors and intelligence systems
(ground, air, and space based) to locate, acquire, and target enemy units.
2. Establishing Conditions for Decisive Operations
During this stage, the commander uses long range Field Artillery fires and
air assets against specific targets to weaken the enemy in preparation for the ground
maneuver forces to move in and defeat the enemy.
3. Decisive Operations
This is the stage during which maneuver forces engage the enemy forces,
both directly and with supporting close Field Artillery fires, in order to win the
decisive battle.
4. Reconstitution
Following the decisive battle, maneuver forces disperse and reconstitute to
perform sustainment operations.
C. FIRE SUPPORT IN AIRLAND OPERATIONS
One of the key principles of AirLand Operations is to destroy enemy forces at
long range with precision fires. The goal is to take advantage of new acquisition
technology which indicates where significant enemy forces are located on the
battlefield. We are then able to minimize friendly casualties by avoiding a battle of
grinding attrition. Instead, we engage the enemy with maneuver forces after he has
been attrited to the point where we are able to quickly and decisively overwhelm him.
Clearly, under AirLand Operations the effective Fire Support of the US Army
Field Artillery is absolutely crucial. It is the means by which enemy forces are
conditioned prior to and during the decisive battle [Ref. 2].
Artillery fire support currently comprises both the Operational Fires ofthe Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the Tactical Fires of both Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS) rockets and cannon weapon systems. Operational fires are
conducted in support of Corps level objectives and focus on longer range targets -these
are referred to as Deep/Long Range Fires. Tactical fires are conducted in support of
Division and Brigade level objectives and focus on shorter range targets - these are
referred to as Close/Short Range Fires. The specific mission of each type of fire
support is outlined below:
OPERATIONAL FIRES : TACTICAL FIRES :
Seize/retain initiative - Destroy enemy forces
Destroy enemy forces/targets - Counterfire
Isolate battlefield - Isolate battlefield
Desynchronize C2 - Close support fires
Set decisive conditions - Final destruction of threat
D. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
1. Background: Legal Mix VII Study
The US Army Field Artillery School's (USAFAS) Directorate of Combat
Developments (DCD) is currently conducting a one year study titled "Legal Mix VH"
to determine the optimal force mix, unit organization, and tactical employment of
future fire support under the AirLand Operations concept. USAFAS is currently
developing several new weapon systems and munitions in order to provide the long
range fires necessary to support the force on the Nonlinear Battlefield. Among the
issues Legal Mix VII is addressing is: " What is the most efficient, combat effective
mix/combination and employment of these next generation weapon systems and
munitions to support the Corps Deep Fires battle?"
2. The Next Generation Artillery Systems
a. Army Tactical Missile System Block I
The Army Tactical Missile System Block I (ATACMS I), is an improved
conventional munition missile fired from the MLRS launcher. It can fire in excess of
100 km and is three times as accurate as its predecessor, the Lance missile. It was
fielded early in order to be used in the Gulf War.
6. Army Tactical Missile System Block II
The Army Tactical Missile System Block II (ATACMS II), will be
equipped with terminally guided submunitions in order to destroy moving enemy
armor. The missile dispenses its submunitions once it is in the vicinity of the targets.
The submunitions then glide towards the armored vehicles until they acquire a specific
target to attack.
c Paladin M109A6
The Paladin M109A6 is an improved version of the current M109 155-
mm self-propelled howitzer. The Paladin, referred to in this study as the Howitzer
Improvement Program (HIP), is equipped with an on-board navigation and computer
system and will provide improved range, survivability, reliability, availability, and
maintainability.
d. Sense and Destroy Armor Munitions
Sense and Destroy Armor munitions (SADARM), are being developed
for both the HIP and the MLRS. SADARM is primarily a counterfire munition - used
to destroy enemy artillery. The SADARM projectile releases submunitions over the
target area which descend by parachute. The submunitions identify targets using
millimeter wave or infrared sensor technology, and explosively fire penetrators onto
the enemy elements.
e. Terminally Guided Projectile / Warhead
The Terminally Guided Projectile (TGP) and the Terminally Guided
Warhead (TGW) are autonomous, terminal-homing, fire-and-forget munitions which
use a millimeter wave seeker to acquire the target. The TGP is fired from the HIP,
and the TGW is fired from the MLRS.[Ref. 31
3. Scope and Purpose
This thesis focuses on the employment of these systems during the Deep
Fires battle in support of US Corps operations in all possible Operational Scenarios in
the year 2000 and beyond. The purpose of this study is to assist USAFAS in
determining the optimal force mix and allocation of fires of these future Field Artillery
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systems. Given the level of damage and effectiveness required by the Corps battlefield
commander and the capabilities of our new developmental Artillery systems, as well
as a projected threat assessment, a GAMS Linear Programming model was developed
to assist in determining how many of these new systems (delivery system and
munitions), to manufacture and how to best allocate them to targets on the future
battlefield in order for the commander to meet his mission effectiveness requirements.
II. PROBLEM APPROACH
A. APPROACH TO FORCE COMPOSITION AND ALLOCATION OF FIRES
1. Optimizing Long Range Fires
Under AirLand Operations, our success clearly depends upon our
accomplishing three things. First, we must effectively disrupt and destroy the enemy's
Command, Control, and Communications (C3) elements. Second, we must destroy a
significant portion of the enemy forces across several echelons (levels/belts of enemy
formations), extending our attack well to the rear of his first echelon front-line forces.
Without effective C3, and heavily attrited, the remaining enemy forces will be much
less capable ofmounting a coherent, coordinated attack or defense. Finally, our success
depends upon our ability to deploy our maneuver forces to engage and destroy these
remaining elements. If we can effectively accomplish the first two, we should be able
to accomplish the third without suffering heavy losses.
This strategy therefore hinges on our ability to acquire and destroy enemy
C3 assets and troop formations from extended ranges early in the battle. Advanced
acquisition systems, such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS), provide us with the location of these targets. We then depend upon our
long range artillery systems, as well as air assets, to destroy them. For the purposes
of this study we will only address the role of the long range artillery.
The new artillery systems being developed are technology intensive, and
therefore much more expensive than previous systems. With a limited budget, we can
only afford a limited inventory. They also take longer to manufacture than the
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cannons and high explosive rounds of past conflicts. Yet we expect future conflict to
be fast paced, highly lethal, and short in duration. Hence, we must plan to fight a
"come as you are" war. We will not have time to gear up production in order to build
up the inventories of the most needed systems. We must take a look now at the
systems we are currently developing, in order to project which systems to build over
the next decade and how many of them we will need in our inventory by the year
2000.
Our most tightly constrained resource is the money we need to build this
future artillery inventory. Therefore, the specific objective of the study is to provide
USAFAS with a tool to determine the most cost effective weapons and munitions mix
with which to equip our army in the future, in order to defeat the enemy force. For
the purpose of this study, defeating the enemy is specifically defined as meeting the
Commander's Kill Criteria. The Measure of Effectiveness applied to the Kill Criteria
is the overall percent of each type of enemy system killed over the entire battle.
Once deployed, these weapons and munitions will be arrayed against
diverse types of enemy systems located all across and at all depths of the battlefield.
Therefore, in order to determine the optimal force mix, we must determine the
optimal weapons and munitions to use to attack each type of system in order to defeat
the enemy we expect to face in the beginning of the next century.
To assist the Artillery School solve this problem, I developed the Artillery
Attack Model Linear Programming model formulation and GAMS program [Ref. 41.
Of course, the results of the model depend upon the specific Operational Scenario
which is used in the model. With the rapidly changing political environment, there are
many possible enemy forces we could face in a variety of locations and climates. The
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model is designed to be a personal computer portable tool, flexible enough for the
artillery force development planner to use to determine the optimal weapons and
munitions mix for any of the possible scenarios . Although the model is primarily
intended to answer the mix (composition), and allocation question for the artillery
systems currently being developed, it is also flexible enough to incorporate the existing
weapon and munition inventories of the current systems. Once the composition of the
necessary systems is determined, they can be budgeted, procured, pre-positioned, and
manned. Then when we " come as we are " onto the next battlefield, we will truly come
with what we need to meet our crucial missions under AirLand Operations.
2. The Deterministic Aggregated Combat Model Approach
In the Artillery Attack model, all combat processes are treated
deterministically. In addition, weapon, munition and target entities are aggregated
together rather than treated individually. This provides the flexibility necessary to
model large artillery elements and their opposing enemy forces without developing a
large, expensive, high resolution model. Aggregation also keeps the model within the
limits of reasonable execution time on a micro-computer. Long range fires are
therefore modeled using average rather than individual engagements. Using
Heterogeneous Aggregation, weapons, munitions, and targets are each tracked by total
number of each sub-type. [Ref. 51 Specific aspects of this aggregation approach to the
combat modeling portion of the study include:
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a. Operational Scenario
The entire study is driven by the Operational Scenario we expect to
face in the future. The key element of the Operational Scenario is the nature of the
enemy force:
1. Who is the enemy?
2. With what systems is the enemy equipped?
3. Where are enemy elements located on the battlefield?
4. When are the enemy elements deployed there?
5. How does the enemy fight (fire and maneuver)?
Other elements of the scenario include: the geographical location and
characteristics, as well as the civil/political situation. In the model, the enemy weapon
systems are categorized as "Targets," and all the information inherent to the
Operational Scenario is aggregated into the Target Data input by the user of the
model. The user defines the different types of Targets, and inputs them by quantity,
location, and battle time phase. He defines how they fight by entering general
mobility and lethality data. Through this methodology, the model can be applied to
any of the possible Operational Scenarios being postulated.
b. Battlefield Representation
The battlefield is represented by a series of Range Bands. The depth
of the Range Bands, which is defined by the user, determines both the
weapons/munitions that are capable of ranging the target and the distance advanced
by the attacking forces during each phase of the battle. This allows the user to
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represent a specific operational scenario with enemy forces properly templated across
and to the full depth of the battlefield.
c Time Advance Mechanism
The model uses a Fixed Time Step to incorporate the passage of time.
This allows the user to depict the variable movement of attacking forces on the
battlefield. The time step is called a "Phase" and its length is set by the user.
d. Movement
The movement of offensive forces is modeled by assigning a movement
rate to each type of enemy element. All elements of a specific type advance the same
number of Range Bands per Phase, depending upon the rate input by the user. To
depict enemy offensive scenarios, each enemy element is assigned a unique movement
rate which most accurately depicts its degree of mobility. Some elements, such as
logistics bases, may be set to remain stationary; while others, such as tank companies,
may be set to advance several Range Bands. To depict long range fires in enemy
defensive scenarios, all enemy elements are assigned a movement rate of zero to
reflect the relatively static nature of Stage two of AirLand Operations.
a Command and Control
The only command and control decision element represented by the
model is the Commander's Kill Criteria, which is the minimum percent of each enemy
system which must be destroyed during each phase of the long range fires battle.
f. Intelligence and Target Acquisition
The model reflects the advanced acquisition technology which AirLand
Operations is predicated upon. The enemy elements input by the user are the focus
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of all Corps target acquisition efforts. Hence, they are assumed to be accurately located
given our advanced acquisition capabilities and susceptible to attack by any
weapon/munition in range.
g. Engagement and Attrition
(1) Linearity ofMassed Fires. Both the engagement of enemy forces
and the attrition of friendly weapons are treated as linear processes. The key to
maximizing the effects of indirect artillery fire against the enemy is achieving surprise.
By putting as much "steel on target" as possible all at once, we catch the enemy when
he is most vulnerable and can achieve devastating results. In order to achieve these
effects, the artillery employs a technique termed "Massing Fires." Massing Fires is
attacking a target with fires from several different units simultaneously. It is
coordinated so all of the rounds impact on the enemy at the exact same time. Each
round can be expected to have the same effect. The effects of Massed Fires are
therefore linear in nature, with the total effects of an attack linearly dependent upon
the type and quantity of munitions used. This is normally the technique employed by
corps units providing Long Range Fires in support of the Preparation and Establishing
phases of AirLand Operations.
The alternate technique is termed "Volley Fire," and is normally
employed when fewer units are available to attack a target. Attacking by Volley Fire
is firing several times in succession at the same target. It normally requires fewer
firing units, but is less effective because it gives the enemy the opportunity to take
protective cover from the shrapnel or move out of the targeted location.
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By employing Massed Fires, we achieve much greater
effectiveness. By modeling Massed Fires, we are able to model the effects of the long
range artillery linearly and avoid the case of the non-linear effects ofVolley Fire which
is more characteristically employed by artillery units supporting maneuver units with
short range, Close-Supporting Fires during the Decisive Operations phase of AirLand
Operations.
(2) Linearity ofAggregated Engagements. In addition to modeling the
natural linearity ofMassed Fires, the aggregated approach employed in this model also
focuses upon the overall linear effects of artillery upon the entire enemy force. The
Artillery Attack Model aggregates all engagements by target type, rather than treating
each engagement individually. While it is not reasonable to expect twice the missions
fired at a given target to have twice the effect, it is reasonable to expect separate
attacks on two individual targets to have twice the effect of either conducted alone
[Ref. 4:p.ll]. The model considers engagements as a series of individual attacks against
individual targets, and treats them in the aggregate.
(3) Effects Construct. The model uses an Effects construct which
combines the Probability of hitting a target and the Probability of killing a target
given that it is hit. Each type of munition is fired from a specific associated weapon
and is able to destroy a specified fraction of each type of enemy system. This construct
fits the aggregated structure of the model and the test data being generated by
USAFAS in its testing of the developmental weapon systems.
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(4) Attrition. A weapon can be used to attack any enemy system
whose range is less than the weapon's Max Range. As weapons fire, they receive
counterfire from the enemy and are attrited based upon the number of missions they
fire and a Loss Rate associated with the munition and the range of the targets. The
more missions a weapon fires, the more likely that it is detected by enemy target
acquisition radar and the more losses it sustains. The closer the weapon is to the
targets, the higher the Loss Rate.
h. Logistics
The overall focus of the study is to determine how many of each
weapon system and type of munition to produce and stock in the inventory. This is
dependent upon the number of enemy forces on the battlefield and how many ofthem
must be destroyed. This in turn drives the number of munitions expended which
determines the number of weapons required, based upon the Rate of Fire for each
weapon.
Each weapon and munition has an associated Production Cost and
Operating and Support Costs (O&S). Weapon Operating and Support Costs are a
function of both time (number of Phases) deployed on the battlefield and amount of
use (number of missions fired). Munition Operating and Support Costs are only a
function of time since munitions can only be "used" once, and the cost of their use is
captured by their Production Cost.
i. Approach Summary
While not representing the aspects of combat processes with the detail
of a high resolution model, this approach incorporates the major elements of the Long
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Range Fires Battle in a straightforward, highly flexible model construct which can be
readily applied by USAFAS to the future force mix problem.
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND SIMPLIFICATIONS
1. The Operational Scenario can be accurately represented by the structure ofthe
user input Target Array and target movement construct.
2. Target priority values are implicitly assigned by the Commander's Kill Criteria
for each type of Target.
3. Meeting the Commander's Kill Criteria for all types of Targets equates to
mission accomplishment for Long Range Fires, without regard for what specific
targets are killed.
4. Friendly units have perfect acquisition of all enemy systems in the Corps area
of the battlefield.
5. There is no difference between day and night Long Range Fires.
6. All fire missions are Fire for Effect without adjusting onto the Target.
7. All Targets are attacked with Massed Fires, not a series of volleys.
8. Targets do not assume different protective postures during the battle.
9. Friendly attrition due to enemy counterfire is a function of the number of
missions fired and the range to the Targets.
10. There are no resupply constraints incorporated into the model. The model
allows the resupply of all the weapons and munitions required to accomplish
the mission.
11. The attacking weapon systems move an integer number of Range Bands per
Phase.
12. The model aggregates weapons, munitions, and targets, and uses average
engagement rates to represent the total results of individual engagements.
13. Systems are not sub-grouped together into individual tactical units.




The model was developed for the Directorate of Combat Developments
(DCD), US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. DCD is responsible for
the development and evaluation of the new long range artillery systems. Many of these
systems are currently being tested. Their performance data is classified and their cost
data is unknown. For the systems still under development, both elements of data are
unknown.
In order to validate the model, we used a notional set of Test Case Data in
order to keep the process unclassified. The results are presented in Chapter IV. The
actual classified data will only be used by DCD at FT Sill.
2. Elements
a. Friendly Force
(1) Types of Weapons and Munitions Available.
(2) Production and Operating and Support Costs.
(3) Number of Battle Phases Being Modeled.
(4) Number ofRange Bands Being Modeled.
(5) Commander's Kill Criteria.
(6) Weapons / Munitions Effects (Lethality).
(7) Weapons / Munitions Max Range.
(8) Weapons / Munitions Operational Mode Maximum Rate of Fire.
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b. Enemy Force
(1) Types ofEnemy Systems (Targets).




(3) New Targets Deploying After Phase 1.
(4) Enemy Counterfire Effectiveness.
20
III. ARTILLERY ATTACK MODEL LP FORMULATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the mathematical formulation of the Artillery Attack
Model. The model is a Minimum Cost Linear Programming formulation. The
formulation is presented in the Naval Postgraduate School Format.
B. INDICES




Multiple Launch Rocket System.
2. Type of Munition - m
a. For HIP
(1) DPICMH. Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions.
(2) HE. High Explosive Projectile.
(3) SADARMH. Sense and Destroy Armor.
(4) TGP. Terminally Guided Projectile.
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b. ForMLRS
(1) ATACMSI. Army Tactical Missile System Block I.
(2) ATACMSII. Army Tactical Missile System Block II.
(3) DPICMM. Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions.
(4) SADARMM. Sense and Destroy Armor.
(5) TGW. Terminally Guided Warhead.









4. Battle Time Phase - p
a. 1
Phase 1 - 1st hour of battle.
b. 2
Phase 2 - 2nd hour of battle.
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c 3
Phase 3 - 3rd hour of battle.
5. Target Range Band - r
a. 1
Target located 00 - 30 KM away.
b. 2
Target located 30 - 60 KM away.
c 3
Target located 60 - 90 KM away.
d. 4
Target located 90 - 120 KM away.
C. DATA
1. DISTANCEt
Number of Range Bands Target t advances per Phase.
2. EFFECTSwmt
Weapon w / Munition m effects against Target type t (Number of Tgts
destroyed per round of munition).
3. FIRERATEwm
Weapon w / Munition m max Operational Mode long-term sustained rate
of fire (Rounds of munition per Phase).
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4. KILPERCENTtr
Commander's Kill Criteria for Target t at Range r (% Target t Range r
killed each Phase).
5. LOSSRATEwmir
Loss Rate of Weapon w firing Munition m at targets at Range r due to
counterfire (# Weapons attrited per round of munition m fired).
6. MAXRANGEwm
Max range for Weapon w / Munition m (Range Band number).
7. MOCOSTm
Munition m O&S Cost per Phase on battlefield (Thousands of dollars).
8. MPCOSTm
Munition m Production Cost (Thousands of dollars).
9. NEWTGTS^
Number of new Targets of type t deployed onto battlefield at Range r
during Phase p.
10. WOCOSTIV^
Weapon w O&S Cost per round of munition fired (Thousands of dollars).
11. WOCOSTPw
Weapon w O&S Cost per Phase on battlefield (Thousands of dollars).
12. WPCOSTw




Number of Munition m remaining at end of Phase p.
2. EXCESSWwp
Number of Weapon w remaining at end of Phase p.
3. MPRODmp
Number of Munitions m required to Produce and Resupply for Phase p.
4. TGTStpr
Total Targets t during Phase p at Range r (Before losses).
5. TOTCOST
Total Cost of Weapons and Munitions (Over entire battle).
6. WPRODwp
Number of Weapons w required to Produce and Resupply for Phase p.
*•
^Nv,m,t,p,r
Number Missions (Rounds) fired by all Weaponsw with Munitionm against
Target t at Range r during Phase p.
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E. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
MINIMIZE TOTAL COST =
^^(WPRODwp * WPCOSTw )
w p
p-i
E *OCOSTPw* J2 WPRODVfi-Y,(Y,Y,Y, X*.*.t.l.r*I'OSSRATEViatZ
P=l \1=1 1=1 \ U T R
EfEEEE <**..,*.p,x * WOCOSTMw )
U T P R




f MWOD.,, " E (E E E *..-.e.i.r)
Vi=l 1=1 \ * T R )}
SUBJECT TO :
1. TGTStpx - [ TGTStp_ltZ +DigTJUtCE{t) ]
2*iE ( *v* *. t.p-i, r*Dl8TAifCt i t) * EFFECTSWi m> t )
W M
NEWTGT3t . x , V (t.p.r)
2. E E ( **.m.t.p.z * BFFECTSWfMft ) * [ TGTStiPiX *
W M
KILPERCENTttZ ] , V (t,p,r)
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w it
4 . WPRODv _ £ E ( E E *r.-.e.p.r / FIRERATEWta \
E E E Zr,.,e,p.r * LOSSRATEVta>r ] - EXCESSWw>p_x , V {w,p)
M T R






Z*t I 2-f i-r Z-f ^»,B,t,i-r *
i=l \ JT r Jt
v,i
LOSSRATE.v,m,z . v (ar,p)
7 . EXCESSMm _ =
E «K»*i zLf [ Z^f Z^f 2^> Xw,m.t.±,z





TOTAL COST = WEAPONS COST + MUNITIONS COST
- Production cost




a. WEAPONS PRODUCTION COST:
Y;Y,(WPRODwj) * WPCOSTw )
w p
b. WEAPONS PIS COST (TIME/PHASE COST) :
£ wocostpJJ: wprodw .-Y: (£ E E (K^lossrate^)]
c. WEAPONS PIS COST (MISSION COST)
E [E E E E (*««*, * WOCOSTMJ] *
w U T P R
d. MUNITIONS PRODUCTION COST:
E E WPROD^ * MPCOSTJ
hi P
e. MUNITIONS PIS COST (TIME/PHASE COST) :
E
M
I P p-\ \
E MOCOSTm * E MPRODmi - E (E E E JUur
) J
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a. Weapons Production Cost
The Weapons Production Cost is the sum of the total production costs
for each type of weapon system.
b. Weapons Operating and Support Cost - for Time Phases
The Weapons O&S Cost for Time Phases captures the O&S costs
(personnel, maintenance, fuel) associated with operating a weapon system for a phase
of the battle independent of the number of missions it fires. It is determined by:
(Weapon Inventory)wp * (O&S Cost per Phase)w for each weapon and each phase.
Weapon Inventoryw p is the total weapons produced minus the number lost up to that
phase of battle. The number of weapons systems lost in a phase is a function of the
missions fired by that type of system and an associated loss-rate.
c. Weapons Operating and Support Cost - for Missions Fired
The Weapons O&S Cost for Missions Fired captures the O&S costs
associated with firing a weapon system. It is determined by:
(Total Missions Fired by Weapon System)w * (O&S Cost per Mission)w for each weapon
system over the entire battle.
d. Munitions Costs
Munitions costs are determined in the same manner except there is
no O&S Cost for missions fired since munitions are used only once and this is captured
by the Munition Production Cost. The munitions inventory is the number produced









The model determines the number of each type of target deployed
within each range band of the battlefield for each phase of the battle. The number of
Targets
t p r
is the number of enemy elements of type t which survived the previous
phase of battle and advanced forward into range band r, plus any NEWTGTS
t pr which
deploy onto range band r of the battlefield during phase p. This is the inventory of
targets present prior to target kills being assessed. The number of targets advancing
into a range band is dependent upon the DISTANCE
t
parameter assigned to each type
of target. The number of targets killed is a function of the munitions fired at that type
of target and the EFFECTSTPR parameter assigned to each type of munition. In
addition to defining the initial array of enemy forces and follow-on echelons, the
parameter NEWTGTS
t pr has the flexibility to be used to introduce airborne and
special forces elements anywhere onto the battlefield.
b. Meet Commander's Kill Criteria - For Each (t,p,r)
E E ( **.„,„, * EFFECTS^ )W M it [ TGTSt^ * KILPERCENTtr ]
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The model optimally determines which targets to attack with the types
of weapons and munitions available. It fires the number of missions necessary to kill
the required percentage of each type of target specified by the maneuver commander.
The model determines where and when to attack targets based upon weapon ranges
and effects, as well as counterfire loss-rates, in order to minimize the cost of achieving
the commander's kill criteria.
c Limit Engagements to Existing Targets - For Each (t,p,r)
E E ( *W, * EFFECTS^, )
W M
s TGTS, nT
The long-range artillery fires cannot kill more targets in a range band,
than the enemy has deployed within that range band of the battlefield.
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LOSSRATEw^ -EXCESSW^
The model determines the number of each type of weapon system
required each phase to deliver the munitions necessary to kill the enemy and to cover
the losses to enemy counterfire. It then subtracts the number of weapons remaining
from the previous phase to determine the WPRODwp . The number required is a
function of the number of missions to be fired and the weapon's operational mode
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maximum rate of fire. Counterfire losses are a function of the number of missions
fired and the LOSSRATEw m r associated with firing the munition at targets at range
r.
c Determine Munition Production/Resupply Requirements - For Each
(m,p)
MPRODmn * C / ' / ' * w,m,tj>,r
W T R
- EXCESSMmn .
The model determines the number of each type of munition required
each phase to kill the enemy. It then subtracts the number remaining from the
previous phase to determine the MPRODm p .




£ WPRODwJ - E ( E E E K^r * WSSRA7EW„, \
1=1 \ M T R 1
The model determines the number of weapons of each type which
remain at the end of each phase by subtracting the total number ofweapons lost from
the total number produced, through that phase of battle.
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The model determines the number of munitions of each type which
remain at the end of each phase by subtracting the total number of munitions fired
from the total produced, through that phase of battle.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE ARTILLERY ATTACK MODEL
A. TEST CASE OPERATIONAL SCENARIO
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the model to a Test Data Case and
examine the results. The Test Case presents an Operational Scenario in which a US
Corps is defending against a Soviet Combined Arms Army (CAA), attacking in Central
Europe. In light of current political changes in the Soviet Union, this appears to be an
unlikely scenario. However, it presents a good example of how the model works within
the context of a threat scenario with which all military analysts are familiar. The CAA
is configured with three Motorized Rifle Divisions and one Tank Division. The model
only depicts maneuver elements, artillery units, and tactical operations centers (C3
elements) for regiments and above. The enemy force is arrayed in March Formation
in preparation for offensive operations. The enemy Order of Battle is depicted below
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Test Case Combined Arms Army Order of Battle
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B. TEST CASK INPUT DATA SET
I. Enemy Forces
The number and location of the initial enemy forces are based upon the
Order of Battle presented in Figure 1, and represented in the model by the following
initial target array values for Parameter NEWTGTStp . lr :
ENEMY FORCES DEPLOYED START OF PHASE 1 :
TARGET TYPE : RANGE 1 RANGE 2 RANGE 3 RANGE 4
ARTILLERY
BATTERIES
9 66 9 24
MOTORIZED RIFLE
COMPANIES










t p . 3 r
matrices are both equal to
soro.
2. Movement of Enemy Forces
The movement of the offensive forces is represented by the following
values for the Parameter DISTANCE,. Tactical Operations Centers are assigned a
movement parameter equal to zero in order to demonstrate the implementation of
stationary targets.
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rrANK COMPANIES .'{() KM 1
3. Commander'H Kill Criteria
The percent of ouch target which the maneuver commander require! to be
killed is outlined in the following values for KILPERCKNTlr :
PERCENTAGE OE ENEMY KORCES REQUIRED TO HE KILLED :
TAROKT TYPE : RANGE 1 RANGE 2 RANGE :i RANGE 4
ARTILLERY
BATTERIES
.8 .8 .5 .5
MOTORIZED RIFLE
COMPANIES




.6 .8 .8 .8
TANK COMPANIES .9 .6 :j 1
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4. Artillery Effectiveness
The lethality of each weapon/munition combination against each type of
enemy element is outlined in the following table of values for the Parameter
EFFECTS U^w.m.t






ARTY MRC TOC TANK
HIP DPICM .05 .08 .08 .05
HIP HE .03 .07 .07 .03
HIP SADARM .07 .10 .10 .07
HIP TGP .08 .12 .12 .08
MLRS ATACMS I .80 1.0 1.0 1.0
MLRS ATACMS II .90 1.0 1.0 1.0
MLRS DPICM .12 .15 .13 .10
MLRS SADARM .13 .16 .15 .12
MLRS TGW .90 1.0 .90 .80
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5. Artillery Rate of Fire
The Operational Mode maximum rate of fire for each weapon/munition
combination input for Parameter FIRERATEW is :
MAX RATE OF FIRE FOR INDIVIDUAL WEAPON/MUNITION :
WEAPON MUNITION
HIP DPICM HE SADARM TGP
3 3 3 3
MLRS ATACMSI ATACMSII DPICM SADARM TGW
6 6 18 18 6
6. Artillery Maximum Range
The maximum range of each weapon/munition is outlined below in the
table values for Parameter MAXRANGEW m :
MAXIMUM RANGE OF WEAPON/MUNITION :
WEAPON MUNITION
HIP DPICM HE SADARM TGP
1 1 1 1
MLRS ATACMSI ATACMSII DPICM SADARM TGW
4 4 2 2 2
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7. Counterfire Rate of Enemy Artillery
As our artillery fires, the enemy target acquisition radar attempts to locate
our units and send counter-battery fire to destroy our artillery elements. The resulting
friendly attrition is a function of the values input for Parameter LOSSRATEw m r :













HIP DPICM .04 .00 .00 .00
HIP HE .04 .00 .00 .00
HIP SADARM .04 .00 .00 .00
HIP TGP .04 .00 .00 .00
MLRS ATACMS I .10 .05 .01 .01
MLRS ATACMS II .10 .05 .01 .01
MLRS DPICM .02 .01 .00 .00
MLRS SADARM .02 .01 .00 .00
MLRS TGW .01 .05 .00 .00
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8. Weapon Costs





O / S COST
(PHASE)
O / S COST
(MISSIONS)
HIP 200 10 1
MLRS 2000 100 10
9. Munition Costs
MUNITION COSTS (Thousands of Dollars)
:
MUNITION PRODUCTION COST O / S COST (PHASE)
ATACMS I 200.0 0.5
ATACMS II 400.0 0.5
DPICM (HIP) 0.8 0.1
DPICM (MLRS) 5.0 0.4
HE 0.3 0.1
SADARM (HIP) 10.0 0.2




C. MODEL SOLUTION PROCEDURE
1. Applying the General Algebraic Modeling System
In order to utilize the computer to solve the Artillery Attack Model, the
Linear Programming model formulation was coded in the General Algebraic Modeling
System (GAMS) programming language. GAMS is a high level language used to
formulate mathematical models with algebraic statements which can be easily modified
and easily transported from one computer environment to another [Ref. 6]. It is an
ideal tool to meet the flexibility and exportability requirements of USAFAS. The
Artillery Attack Model GAMS computer formulation is presented in Appendix A.
2. Applying the Zero/One Optimization Method XMP Solver
Once the model was encoded in the GAMS programming language, it was
solved utilizing the solution algorithm of the Zero/One Optimization Method (ZOOM)
Solver. ZOOM is a Fortran based system used to solve Mixed Integer Programming
problems. GAMS/ZOOM first solves the problem as a Linear Program using the XMP
Linear Programming library. It then uses the Pivot and Complement heuristic , as well
as, the Branch and Bound search procedure to find an integer solution. [Ref. 6:p. 225]
D. TEST CASE OUTPUT / RESULTS
Solving the model using GAMS/ZOOM generated the GAMS Listing file "AAM
LISTING" which is presented in Appendix B. Although AAM GAMS is coded as a
Mixed Integer Problem (MLP), solving for the integer solution takes an inordinate
amount of central processor time (CPU). Solving the problem as a Relaxed Mixed
Integer Problem (RMIP), not only takes a fraction of the CPU time, but also yields a
very good real number approximation.
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The Test Case problem was first solved using RMIP and then modified to display
an integer equivalent solution using the GAMS CEIL function which rounds up to the
next higher integer. This yields the most "conservative" approximation of the missions,
weapons, and munitions required for the given scenario. The total cost for both the
real and integer set of missions, weapons, and munitions are displayed at the bottom
of the Listing File. The specific results are outlined below.
1. Part I - Optimal Weapon / Munition Mix
a. Weapons Required
NUMBER OF WEAPONS REQUIRED :
WEAPON
SYSTEM :





NUMBER OF MUNITIONS REQUIRED :
MUNITION TYPE : PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 TOTAL
ATACMS I 68 19 1 88
ATACMS II
DPICM (HIP) 54 48 102





TGW 106 36 29 171
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2. Part II - Optimal Target Allocation
a. Target Type - Artillery Batteries
MUNITIONS USED TO ATTACK - ARTILLERY BATTERIES :
MUNITION
TYPE :
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 TOTAL








TGW 67 16 7 90
45
b. Target Type - Motorized Rifle Companies
MUNITIONS USED TO ATTACK - MOTOR. RIFLE COMPANIES :
MUNITION
TYPE :
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 TOTAL
ATACMS I 3 2 5
ATACMS II
DPICM (HIP) 54 48 102





TGW 32 6 38
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c. Target Type - Tactical Operations Centers
MUNITIONS USED TO ATTACK - TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTERS :
MUNITION
TYPE :
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 TOTAL
ATACMS I 10 2 2 14
ATACMS n
DPICM (HIP)







d. Target Type - Tank Companies
MUNITIONS USED TO ATTACK - TANK COMPANIES :
MUNITION
TYPE :
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 TOTAL








TGW 15 24 39
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3. Part III - Optimal Total Cost
TOTAL COST (Dollars)
$ 132,586,600
4. Analysis of Model Results
It is interesting to note that the Test Case results indicate that all weapon
systems required over the entire three phase battle should be supplied during the
initial phase of battle. This makes intuitive sense in view of the fact that there are 45
enemy company sized units already within 30 km at the start of Phase one, and the
closer the enemy units are, the higher the percentage that must be killed. Therefore
the model expends in Phase 1, over a third of the total munitions required for the
entire battle. Given the maximum operational mode weapon rates of fire and the
resulting attrition, the weapons required for Phase 1 are sufficient to meet all fire




The Artillery Attack Model provides the Artillery School with a Mixed Integer
Linear Programming formulation to assist in determining the optimal (least expensive)
weapon/munition force mix and tactical employment of the next generation artillery
systems. The model is coded in the GAMS programming language used at USAFAS
and employs the standard GAMS/ZOOM solver. The model can be easily modified by
the user to incorporate changing tactics or technologies. It provides the flexibility to
model the myriad of operational scenarios possible in today's changing political
environment. It can also integrate any future weapon/munition technology with
supporting or projected performance and support data, as well as, accommodate
existing inventories of current weapon systems. The Artillery Attack Model will help
ensure that the US Field Artillery is prepared to provide the long range fires so crucial
to our success under AirLand Operations - the same consistently accurate and deadly




Presently, the model does not incorporate the reconstitution capability
of units - the repair and return to service of damaged weapon systems. This can be
done by designating a certain percentage of enemy targets killed and friendly attrition
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losses as damaged rather than destroyed. Currently all target kills and attrition losses
are considered catastrophic kills.
b. Expanded Target Types
The model could be expanded to represent more enemy Combat
Support and Combat Service Support elements such as Air Defense, Engineer, Signal,
and Logistics units.
c Day / Night Distinction
If test data suggests degraded target acquisition and engagement at
night, then the model could be modified to incorporate a day phase/night phase
rotation sequence with separate day and night NUMTGTS
t p r
and EFFECTSW m t data.
d. PHIT/PKILL Construct
The model employs a low-resolution approach to modeling the effects
of engaging enemy forces, using a fractional kill per round of munition fired. If data
were available to determine the probability of hit given accurate target location and
the subsequent probability of kill given the target is hit, engagement could be modeled
perhaps more precisely using a Bayesian probability methodology.
e. Incorporate the Non-Linearity of Changing Protective Posture
Although long range fires are normally massed and the model deals
with targets in the aggregate, the Commander's Kill Criteria may dictate that a certain
portion of enemy elements are attacked more than once in a phase. This would result
in reduced effects as they move either under cover or to an alternate position. In order
to capture this possible aspect of battle, the long range fires process could either be
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modeled non-linearly or an effectiveness factor could be applied to the EFFECTSwmt
Parameter based upon the percentage of a given target type engaged during a given
phase.
2. Follow - On Study
The next logical question to be answered is: "Once we have the weapons
and munitions we need, where do we put them?" This is a three step problem:
a. Input
The determining inputs to the problem are the costs and the scenarios.
First we must determine or estimate the costs to pre-position the weapons and
munitions at a various forward locations, as well as, the subsequent costs to deploy
them from these locations to the battlefield when conflict develops. Costs can be in
terms of money and/or deployment time.
Secondly, we must develop target arrays for likely operational
scenarios, as well as, the likelihood (probability) of each scenario.
b. Process
The process involves developing an optimization model which analyzes
the weapons/munitions available, the probability of each operational scenario, and the
proximity (cost) associated with deploying the necessary artillery inventory from the
possible pre-position sites to each theater of operation, in order to determine the
Minimum Cost (money or time).
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c Output
The follow-on study would determine the Minimum Cost (money or
time), pre-deployment scheme for the future artillery inventory, in order for the
artillery to best accommodate our increasing reliance upon Rapid-Deployment and
Forward Presence.
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APPENDIX A. AAM GAMS PROGRAM
$TITLE ARTILLERY ATTACK MODEL
$STITLE -- Combined Arms Army - Offensive Scenario -
** GAMS AND DOLLAR CONTROL OPTIONS
$OFFUPPER OFFSYMXREF OFFSYMLIST
OPTIONS SOLPRINT = OFF , LIMROW = 0, RESLIM = 10000
OPTIONS OPTCR =0.1 , LIMCOL = , ITERLIM = 100000
OPTIONS SYSOUT = OFF ;
** DEFINITIONS AND INPUT DATA **
SET W Weapon System / HIP Improved Howitzer
MLRS Mult Launch Rocket Sys /
M Munition Type /
* FOR HIP:
DPICMH HIP Dual Purp Imp Conv
HE High Explosive
SADARMH HIP Sense\Destroy Armor
TGP Term Guided Proj
* FOR MLRS:
ATACMSI Army Tac Missile(DPICM)
ATACMSII (Longer Range)
DPICMM MLRS Dual Purp Imp Conv
SADARMM MLRS Sense\Destroy Armor
TGW Term Guided Warhead /
T Target Type /
ARTY Artillery Battery
MRC Motorized Rifle Company
TANK Tank Company
TOC Reg\Div Tac Opns Center /
P Battle Phase / 1 Hour 1
2 Hour 2
3 Hour 3 /
R Target Range / 1 Tgt Between - 30 KM Away
2 30-60
3 60-90
4 90 -120 /
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WCOSTS Wpn Costs / WPCOST Wpn Production Cost
WOCOSTP 0\S Cost per Battle Phase
WOCOSTM 0\S Cost per Msn Fired /
MCOSTS Mun Costs / MPCOST Mun Production Cost(Per Rd)









TABLE KILPERCENT(T,R) % Tgts Type T Required Killed Range R
Range Range Range Range
1 2 3 4
ARTY 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5
MRC 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1
TANK 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.1
TOC 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
TABLE NEWTGTS(T,P,R) # New Tgts Deployed Onto Battlefield
*
at Range R, During Phase P
Phase 1 : Range 1 Range 2 Range 3 Range
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
ARTY 9 66 9 24
MRC 9 72 9 12
TANK 27 27 30
TOC 9 6 6
Phase 2 :












TABLE EFFECTS(W,M,T) Munition Effectiveness\Lethality
(% Tgt T Killed\Rd)
* Weapon/Munition: Target:
ARTY MRC TANK TOC
HIP.DPICMH 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08
HIP.HE 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07
HIP.SADARMH 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10
HIP.TGP 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12
MLRS.ATACMSI 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00
MLRS.ATACMSII 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00
MLRS.DPICMM 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.15
MLRS.SADARMM 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.16
MLRS.TGW 0.90 0.90 0.80 1.00
TABLE FIRERATE(W,M) Wpn\Mun Long-Term Sustained
* Rate of Fire (Rds/Phase)
* Weapon: Munition:
DPICMH SADARMH TGP HE
HIP 3 3 3 3
+ DPICMM SADARMM TGW ATACMSI ATACMSD
MLRS 18 18 6 6 6
TABLE MAXRANGE(W,M) Max Range of Wpn\Mun Combination
* (range band)
* Weapon: Munition:
DPICMH SADARMH TGP HE
HIP 1 1 11
+ DPICMM SADARMM TGW ATACMSI ATACMSII
MLRS 2 2 2 4 4
TABLE LOSSRATE(W,M,R) Wpn Rate of Loss to Enemy Counterfire
* (% Wpns Disabled\Dcstr per Rd Fired)
Munition: Range Range Range Range
1 2 3 4
HIP.DPICMH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
HIP.HE 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00









MLRS.ATACMSII 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01


































EXCESSM(M.P) # Mun M Remaining End Phase P
EXCESSW(W,P) # Wpn W Remaining End Phase P
TGTS(T,P,R) Total Tgts T \ Phase P \ Range R
* on Battlefield (Before Losses)
INTEGER
VARIABLES
MPROD(M.P) # Mun M Produced\Resupplied for Phase P
WPROD(W,P) # Wpn W Produced\Resupplied for Phase P
X(W,M,T,P,R) # Msns Fired by All Wpn W\Mun M Combo ;
* at Tgt T \ Phase P \ Range R
* SET BOUNDARIES
MPROD.LO(M.P) = ;
MPROD.UP(M,P) = 400 ;
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WPROD.LO(W,P) =
WPROD.UP(W,P) = 50 ;
X.LO(W,M,T,P,R) = ;
X.UP(W,M,T,P,R) = 400 ;
* Set Model Not to Attack Targets Out of Range:
X.FX(W,M,T,P,R)$(ORD(R) GT MAXRANGE(W,M)) =
;
* Set Model Not to Use Incompatible Wpn\Mun Combos:
X.FX(W,M,T,P,R)$(EFFECTS(W,M,T) EQ 0) =
;
VARIABLE TOTCOST Total Cost of Weapons and Munitions ;
* (Over Entire Battle)
EQUATIONS OBJ Calculate Total Cost of Wpns and Muns
NUMTGTS(T,P,R) Determine # Tgts T at Range R Phase P
MINKILLS(T,P,R) Meet Kill Crit Tgt T Phase P Range R
MAXKILLS(T,P,R) Limit Engagements to Existing Tgts
WPNPROD(W,P) Determine Wpn Prod\Resupply Requirements
MUNPROD(M.P) Determine Mun Prod\Resupply Requirements
SETEXCESSW(W,P) Determine # Wpn W Remaining End Phase P
SETEXCESSM(M,P) Determine # Mun M Remaining End Phase P
;
* Minimize Total Cost :
OBJ.. TOTCOST =E= SUM((W,P), WPNCOSTS(W,'WPCOST') * WPROD(W,P)) +
SUM((W,P), WPNCOSTS(W,'WOCOSTP') *
(SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)), WPROD(W,I))-
SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE (ORD(P)-l)),SUM((M,T,R),
X(W,M,T,I,R) * LOSSRATE(W,M,R))))) +
SUMCCW.M.T.P.R), WPNCOSTS(W,'WOCOSTM') *
X(W,M,T,P,R)) +
SUM((M,P), MUNCOSTS(M,'MPCOST') * MPROD(M,P)) +
SUM((M,P), MUNCOSTS(M,'MOCOST') *
(SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)),MPROD(M,I)) -




NUMTGTS(T,P,R).. TGTS(T,P,R) =E= TGTS(T,P-1,R + DISTANCE(T))
SUM((W,M), XCW.M.T.P-l.R + DISTANCE(T)) *
EFFECTS(W,M,T)) + NEWTGTS(T,P,R)
;
MINKILLSCT.P.R).. SUM((W,M), X(W,M,T,P,R) *
EFFECTS(W,M,T)) =G=
TGTS(T,P,R) * KILPERCENT(T,R)
MAXKILLSCTP.R).. SUM(CW.M), XCW.M.T.P.R) * EFFECTS(W,M,T)) -L>
TGTS(T,P,R)
;
WPNPROD(W,P).. WPROD(W,P) =G =
SUM(M$(FIRERATE(W,M) NE 0), SUM((T,R),
X(W,M,T,P,R)/FIRERATE(W,M))) +
SUM((M,T,R), X(W,M,T,P,R) * LOSSRATE(W,M,R))-
EXCESSW(W,P-1)
;
MUNPROD(M,P).. MPROD(M.P) =G =
SUM((W,T,R), X(W,M,T,P,R))
EXCESSM(M,P-1)
SETEXCESSW(W,P).. EXCESSW(W,P) =E =
SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)), WPROD(W,I)) -
SUM(I$(ORDa) LE ORD(P)),
SUM((M,T,R), X(W,M,T,I,R)* LOSSRATE(W,M,R))) ;
SETEXCESSM(M,P).. EXCESSM(M,P) =E =
SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)),
(MPROD(M,I) - SUM((W,T,R), X(W,M,T,I,R)»> ;
SOLVE MODEL USING RELAXED MIP
MODEL ARTYATTACK / ALL / ;
SOLVE ARTYATTACK USING RMIP MINIMIZING TOTCOST ;
* GENERATE INTEGER SOLUTION BY ROUNDING RMIP SOLUTION *
X.L(W,M,T,P,R) = CEIL(X.L(W,M,T,P,R» ;
WPROD.L(W,P) = CEIL(WPROD.L(W,P)) ;
MPROD.L(M.P) = CEIL(MPROD.L(M,P)) ;
59
PARAMETER WEAPONS(V) ;
WEAPONS(W,TOTAL #') = SUM(P,WPROD.L(W,P));
PARAMETER MUNITIONS**,*)
;
MUNITIONS(M,'TOTAL #') = SUM(P,MPROD.L(M,P));











FIND TOTAL COST OF INTEGER SOLUTION *
SCALAR WHOLECOST ;
WHOLECOST = SUM((W,P), WPNCOSTS(W,'WPCOST') * WPROD.L(W,P)) +
SUM((W,P), WPNCOSTS(W,'WOCOSTP') *
(SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)), WPROD.L(W,I))-
SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE (ORD(P)-l)),SUM((M,T,R),
X.L(W,M,T,I,R) * LOSSRATE(W,M,R))))) +
SUM((W,M,T,P,R), WPNCOSTS(W,'WOCOSTM') *
X.L(W,M,T,P,R)) +
SUM((M,P), MUNCOSTS(M,'MPCOST') * MPROD.L(M.P)) +
SUM((M,P), MUNCOSTS(M,'MOCOST') *
(SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)),MPROD.L(M,I)) -
SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE (ORD(P)-l)), SUM((W,T,R),
X.L(W,M,T,I,R)))))
;
DISPLAY 'SOLUTION - PART IE : TOTAL COST : ', TOTCOST.L , WHOLECOST ;
DETERMINE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO SOLUTIONS:
SCALAR DELTA
;
DELTA = (WHOLECOST - TOTCOST.L) * 100 / TOTCOST.L ;
DISPLAY DELTA
,
' % INCREASE USING ROUNDED UP SOLUTION ';
60
APPENDIX B. AAM TEST CASE GAMS LISTING
1GAMS 2.19 IBM CMS 09/10/91 20:22:31 PAGE 1
GENERAL ALGEBRAIC MODELING SYSTEM
COMPILATION
1
1GAMS 2.19 IBM CMS 09/10/91 20:22:31 PAGE
ARTILLERY ATTACK MODEL
-- COMBINED ARMS ARMY - OFFENSIVE SCENARIO --
4
5
6 ** GAMS AND DOLLAR CONTROL OPTIONS
8
9 OPTIONS SOLPRINT = OFF , LIMROW = 0, RESLIM = 10000
10 OPTIONS OPTCR = 0.1 , LIMCOL = 0, ITERLIM = 100000




14 *•-- DEFINITIONS AND INPUT DATA
15
16 SET W Weapon System /HIP Improved Howitzer
17 MLRS Mult Launch Rocket
Sys /
18
19 M Munition Type /
20 * FOR HIP:
21 DPICMH HIP Dual Purp Imp Conv
22 HE High Explosive
23 SADARMH HIP Sense\Destroy
Armor
24 TGP Term Guided Proj
25
26 * FOR MLRS:




29 DPICMM MLRS Dual Purp Imp
Conv
30 SADARMM MLRS Sense\Destroy
Armor





34 T Target Type /
35 ARTY Artillery Battery
36 MRC Motorized Rifle Company
37 TANK Tank Company




41 P Battle Phase / 1 Hour 1
42 2 Hour 2
43 3 Hour 3 /
44
45 R Target Range / 1 Tgt Between - 30 KM Away
46 2 30 - 60
47 3 60 - 90
48 4 90 -120
/
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49
50 WCOSTS Wpn Costs / WPCOST Wpn Production Cost
51 WOCOSTP 0\S Cost per Battle
Phase
52 WOCOSTM 0\S Cost per Msn
Fired /
53
54 MCOSTS Mun Costs / MPCOST Mun Production
Cost(Per Rd)








60 PARAMETER DISTANCE(T) # Range Bands
Phase








68 TABLE KILPERCENTCT.R) % Tgts Type T Required Killed
Range R
69
70 * Range Range Range Range
71 1 2 3 4
72
73 ARTY 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5
62
MRC 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1
TANK 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.1







80 TABLE NEWTGTS(T,P,R) # New Tgts Deployed Onto
Battlefield
81 * at Range R, During
Phase P
Range 483 * Phase 1 : Range 1 Range 2 Range 3
84 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
85 ARTY 9 66 9 24
86 MRC 9 72 9 12
87 TANK 27 27 30
88 TOC 9 6 6
89
90 * Phase 2 :
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106 TABLE EFEECTS(W,M,T) Munition
Effectiveness\Lethality
107 * (% Tgt T Killed\Rd)
108
109 * Weapon/Munition: Target:
110 ARTY MRC TANK TOC
111 HIP.DPICMH 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08
112 HIP.HE 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07
113 HIP.SADARMH 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10







MLRS.ATACMSI 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00
MLRS.ATACMSII 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00
MLRS.DPICMM 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.15
MLRS.SADARMM 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.16





124 TABLE FIRERATE(W,M) Wpn\Mun Long-Term Sustained
125 * Rate of Fire (Rds/Phase)
126
127 * Weapon: Munition:
128 DPICMH SADARMH TGP HE
129 HIP 3 3 3 3
130
131 + DPICMM SADARMM TGW ATACMSI ATACMSII




136 TABLE MAXRANGE(W,M) Max Range of Wpn\Mun Combination
137 * (range band)
138
139 * Weapon: Munition:
140 DPICMH SADARMH TGP HE
141 HIP 1 111
142
143 + DPICMM SADARMM TGW ATACMSI ATACMSII




148 TABLE LOSSRATE(W,M,R) Wpn Rate of Loss to Enemy
Counterfire
1GAMS 2.19 IBM CMS 09/10/91 20:22:31 PAGE 5
ARTILLERY ATTACK MODEL
- COMBINED ARMS ARMY - 0FFENSP7E SCENARIO --
149 * (% Wpns Disabled\Destr per Rd
Fired)
150
151 * Munition: Range Range Range Range
152 12 3 4
153 HIP.DPICMH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
154 HIP.HE 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
155 HIP.SADARMH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00










166 TABLE WPNCOSTS(W,WCOSTS) (Thousands of Dollars)
167
168 * Weapon:
MLRS.ATACMSI 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01
MLRS.ATACMSII 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01
MLRS.DPICMM 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
MLRS.SADARMM 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
MLRS.TGW 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.00
64
169 WPCOST WOCOSTP WOCOSTM
170 HIP 200 10 1
171








180 ATACMSI 200.0 0.5
181 ATACMSII 400.0 0.5
182 DPICMH 0.8 0.1
183 DPICMM 5.0 0.4
184 HE 0.3 0.1
185 SADARMH 10.0 0.2
186 SADARMM 20.0 0.4
187 TGP 10.0 0.2










197 EXCESSM(M,P) # Mun M Remaining End Phase P
198
199 EXCESSW(W,P) # Wpn W Remaining End Phase P
200
201 TGTS(T,P,R) Total Tgts T \ Phase P \ Range R
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202 * on Battlefield (Before Losses)
203 INTEGER
204 VARIABLES
205 MPROD(M,P) # Mun M Produced\Resupplied for
Phase P
206
207 WPROD(W,P) # Wpn W Produced\Resupplied for
Phase P
208
209 X(W,M,T,P,R) # Msns Fired by All Wpn W\Mun M
Combo
;
210 * at Tgt T \ Phase P \ Range R
211
212 * SET BOUNDARIES
213 MPROD.LO(M,P) = ;
214 MPROD.UP(M.P) = 400 ;
65
215
216 WPROD.LO(W,P) = ;
217 WPROD.UP(W,P) = 50 ;
218
219 X.LO(W,M,T,P,R) = ;
220 X.UP(W,M,T,P,R) = 400 ;
221
222 * Set Model Not to Attack Targets Out of Range:
223 X.FX(W,M,T,P,R)$(ORD(R) GT MAXRANGE(W,M)) =
224 * Set Model Not to Use Incompatible Wpn\Mun Combos:
225 X.FX(W,M,T)P,R)$(EFFECTS(W,M,T) EQ 0) =0
»
226
227 VARIABLE TOTCOST Total Cost of Weapons and
Munitions ;




232 EQUATIONS OBJ Calculate Total Cost of Wpns and
Muns
233
234 NUMTGTS(T,P,R) Determine # Tgts T at Range R
Phase P
235
236 MINKILLS(T,P,R) Meet Kill Crit Tgt T Phase P
Range R
237
238 MAXKTLLS(T,P,R) Limit Engagements to Existing Tgts
239
240 WPNPROD(W,P) Determine Wpn Prod\Resupply
Requirements
241
242 MUNPROD(M.P) Determine Mun Prod\Resupply
Requirements
243
244 SETEXCESSW(W,P) Determine # Wpn W Remaining End
Phase P
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245









253 * Minimize Total Cost :
254
66
255 OBJ.. TOTCOST =E= SUM((W,P), WPNCOSTS(W,'WPCOST') *
WPROD(W,P)) +
256
257 SUM((W,P), WPNCOSTS(W,'WOCOSTP') *
258 (SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)), WPROD(W,I))-
259 SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE (ORD(P)-l)),SUM((M,T,R),
260 X(W,M,T,I,R) * LOSSRATE(W,M,R))))) +
261
262 SUM((W,M,T,P,R), WPNCOSTS(W,'WOCOSTM') *
263 X(W,M,T,P,R)) +
264
265 SUM((M,P), MUNCOSTS(M,'MPCOST') *
MPROD(M.P)) +
266
267 SUM((M,P), MUNCOSTS(M,'MOCOST') *
268 (SUMa$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)),MPROD(M,I)) -




273 * Subject To :
274
275
276 NUMTGTS(T,P,R).. TGTS(T,P,R) =E= TGTS(T,P-1,R +
DISTANCE(T)) -
277 SUM((W,M), X(W,M,T,P-1,R + DISTANCE(T)
)*
278 EFFECTS(W,M,T)) + NEWTGTS(T,P,R)
279
280
281 MINKILLS(T,P,R)-. SUM((W,M), X(W,M,T,P,R) *
282 EFFECTS(W,M,T)) =G =
283 TGTS(T,P,R) * KILPERCENT(T,R)
284
285
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289
290 WPNPROD(W,P).. WPROD(W,P) =G =
291 SUM(M$(FIRERATE(W,M) NE 0), SUM((T,R),
292 X(W,M,T,P,R)/FIRERATE(W,M))) +






297 MUNPROD(M,P).. MPROD(M,P) =G =




302 SETEXCESSW(W.P).. EXCESSW(W,P) =E =
303 SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)), WPROD(W,I))






308 SETEXCESSM(M,P).. EXCESSM(M,P) =E =
309 SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)),










317 MODEL ARTYATTACK / ALL / ;
318
319 SOLVE ARTYATTACK USING RMIP MINIMIZING TOTCOST ;
320
321
322 * GENERATE INTEGER SOLUTION BY ROUNDING RMIP SOLUTION
323
324 XL(W,M,T,P,R) = CEIL(X.L(W,M,T,P,R))
;
325 WPROD.L(W,P) = CEIL(WPROD.L(W,P)) ;
326 MPROD.L(M.P) = CEIL(MPROD.L(M,P)) ;
327
328
329 PARAMETER WEAPONS(V) ;
330 WEAPONSCW,'TOTAL #') = SUM(P,WPROD.L(W,P));
331
332
333 PARAMETER MUNITIONS(V) ;
334 MUNITIONS(M,TOTAL #') = SUM(P,MPROD.L(M,P));
335
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336
68
337 DISPLAY 'SOLUTION - PART I : WEAPON / MUNITION MIX:',
338 WPROD.L , WEAPONS, MPROD.L , MUNITIONS ;
339
340
341 DISPLAY 'SOLUTION - PART II : TARGET ALLOCATION ' , X.L ;
342
343
344 * FIND TOTAL COST OF INTEGER SOLUTION
345
346 SCALAR WHOLECOST ;
347
348 WHOLECOST = SUM((W,P), WPNCOSTS(W,'WPCOST') * WPROD.L(W,P))
+
349
350 SUM((W,P), WPNCOSTS(W,'WOCOSTP') *
351 (SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)), WPROD.L(W,I))-
352 SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE (ORD(P)-l)),SUM((M,T,R),
353 X.L(W,M,T,I,R) * LOSSRATE(W,M,R))))) +
354
355 SUM((W,M,T,P,R), WPNCOSTS(W,'WOCOSTM') *
356 X.L(W,M,T,P,R)) +
357
358 SUM((M,P), MUNCOSTS(M,'MPCOST') *
MPROD.L(M,P)) +
359
360 SUM((M,P), MUNCOSTS(M,'MOCOST') *
361 (SUM(I$(ORD(I) LE ORD(P)),MPROD.L(M,D) -










369 * DETERMINE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO SOLUTIONS:
370 SCALAR DELTA
;




' % INCREASE USING ROUNDED UP SOLUTION ';
374
COMPILATION TIME = 0.310 SECONDS
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MODEL STATISTICS SOLVE ARTYATTACK USING RMIP FROM LINE 319
MODEL STATISTICS
69
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS 8 SINGLE EQUATIONS 211
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES 7 SINGLE VARIABLES 979
NON ZERO ELEMENTS 5744 DISCRETE VARIABLES 249
GENERATION TIME = 2.290 SECONDS
EXECUTION TIME = 2.470 SECONDS
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SOLUTION REPORT SOLVE ARTYATTACK USING RMIP FROM LINE 319
SOLVE SUMMARY
MODEL ARTYATTACK OBJECTIVE TOTCOST
TYPE RMIP DIRECTION MINIMIZE
SOLVER ZOOM FROM LINE 319
**** SOLVER STATUS 1 NORMAL COMPLETION
**** MODEL STATUS 1 OPTIMAL
**** OBJECTWE VALUE 130805.9741
RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT 1.346 10000.000
ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT 218 100000
ZOOM/XMP — Version 2.1 Jun 1988
Courtesy of Dr Roy E. Marsten,
Department of Management Information Systems,
University of Arizona,




* number of hot LP bases saved during B&B
MAX SAVE 30
* control order of branching 1, 2, or 3
ORDER 1
* number of attractive nonbasic var.
* saved during major iter.
MULTD7LE 30
* relative gap between opt int. ans and LP ans.
*GAP 0.5
INCUMBENT == 0.215495
• how often to reivert basis
INVERT = 10





Work space needed (estimate) - 31855 words.
Work space available — 31855 words.
Maximum obtainable -- 291069 words.
The LU factors occupied 747 slots (estimate 7464).
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337 SOLUTION - PART I : WEAPON / MUNITION MTX:
-~














ATACMSI 68.000 19.000 1.000
DPICMM 231.000 33.000
TGW 106.000 36.000 29.000
71








— 341 SOLUTION - PART H : TARGET ALLOCATION
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EXECUTING
--- 341 VARIABLE X.L # MSNS FIRED BY ALL WPN W\MUN M
COMBO



















INDEX 1 = MLRS INDEX 2 = DPICMM
1 2
MRC .2 222.000














— 366 SOLUTION - PART m : TOTAL COST :
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EXECUTING
366 VARIABLE TOTCOST.L = 130805.974 TOTAL COST
OF WEAPONS
AND MUNITIONS
PARAMETER WHOLECOST = 132586.600
373 PARAMETER DELTA
1.361 % INCREASE USING ROUNDED UP SOLUTION
***• FILE SUMMARY FOR USER 8876P
INPUT AAM5 GAMS A
OUTPUT AAM5 LISTING A
EXECUTION TIME = 0.460 SECONDS
73
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